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Abstract: How did Moses Mendelssohn reconcile a naturalistic theory of language, 
advocating the contingent development of all tongues, with the belief that Hebrew was a 
divine language that did not change ever since its inception? The seeming contradiction 
was resolved by employing the contemporary notion of the language of action – a 
primordial means of communication, where gesture and melody were as significant as 
words. Mendelssohn’s view of Hebrew as the language closest to this idiom was 
accompanied by his suggestion that the Jewish ceremonial law is a living script which can 
be properly understood only through oral instruction. He employed both ideas to counter 
the notions that the Hebrew vowel points were a late invention and that some loci in the 
Hebrew Bible had been subject to textual corruption. For Mendelssohn, the allegedly 
supernatural aspects of spoken Hebrew could be naturalised through constant and lively 
human conversation across the ages. The appropriation of contemporary critiques of the 
arbitrariness of language allowed Mendelssohn to forge an original synthesis that could 
simultaneously accommodate naturalism and providentialism.  
 
 
If this essay starts with Heinrich Heine’s well-known comparison between Moses 
Mendelssohn and Martin Luther, it is only in order to question this nineteenth-century 
commentary on Mendelssohn. Heine saw the Jewish philosopher and the Christian 
reformer as the intellectual pioneers of a return to the Bible which involved, respectively, 
the undermining of rabbinical literature and Catholic scholasticism.  
 
As Luther overthrew the papacy, so Mendelssohn overthrew the Talmud, and 
in the exactly same way: by rejecting tradition, declaring the Bible to be the 
source of religion, and translating its most important part. He thus destroyed 
Jewish Catholicism as Luther destroyed the Christian version.1 
 
A renewed focus on the Hebrew Bible and the study of Hebrew grammar and literature 
was, indeed, a central tenet of the Jewish Enlightenment (Haskalah). Mendelssohn 
dedicated much time and effort to the project of translating the Pentateuch into German 
(and commenting upon it in Hebrew), which may have strengthened the association in 
Heine’s mind between him and Luther. Yet Mendelssohn was no radical reformer. Not 
only did he personally and philosophically exhibit the opposite qualities to those usually 
ascribed to religious enthusiasts (Schwärmer); he never wished to ‘overthrow’ or to 
‘destroy’ the Talmud. He was less extreme than Jews of the next generation on various 
fronts. Unlike Salomon Maimon, he did not believe in the absolute authority of reason; he 
                                                
1 Heinrich Heine, On the History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany and Other Writings, ed. Terry 
Pinkard, trans. Howard Pollack-Milgate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 69; Heines Werke 
in fünf Bänden (Berlin and Weimar: Aufbau-Verlag, 1967), vol. 5,  84. On this passage in relation to Heine’s 
and Mendelssohn’s views on religious symbolism see Gideon Freudenthal, ‘Moses Mendelssohn: 
Iconoclast’, in Moses Mendelssohn’s Metaphysics and Aesthetics, ed. Reinier Munk (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2011), 351-72. 
  
2 
 
would have also abhorred David Friedländer’s suggestion to create a Protestant-Jewish 
union in Prussia by forsaking some basic Jewish customs.2 Unlike Luther, he did not 
regard traditional ceremonies, rituals, and symbols as superfluous elements of Judaism 
which might be safely swept aside. He took up the serious challenge of reconciling 
rabbinic literature with biblical Scripture, providing a modern interpretation of both in 
support of an Enlightened Judaism that remained faithful to its historical traditions. The 
comprehensiveness of Mendelssohn’s stance and the accompanying tensions in his thought 
may arguably be perceived nowhere better than in his views on the Hebrew language. 
  I shall first delineate Mendelssohn’s general theory of language: its function, 
origin, and characteristics. On these issues, Mendelssohn’s naturalistic framework largely 
reflected eighteenth-century debates over language and mind. The second part of this essay 
will concentrate on Mendelssohn’s views on Hebrew, especially in the introduction to his 
German translation of the Torah. There Hebrew enjoys a special status as an unchanging, 
providentially maintained holy tongue. At the centre of my final discussion will stand the 
tension between Mendelssohn’s general views on language and his particular treatment of 
Hebrew – reflecting the larger issue of particularism and universalism in his work. 
However, I shall suggest that Mendelssohn’s appropriation of contemporary critiques of 
the arbitrariness of language allowed him to forge an original synthesis that could 
accommodate both naturalism and providentialism simultaneously.  
 
 
Human language: natural and conventional 
 
The intellectual amalgam designated here as eighteenth-century naturalism consisted in the 
view that human beings constructed their civilisation (materially as well as intellectually) 
on their own and for themselves. Divine providence may have supervised and maintained 
these achievements, but God’s direct intervention was not necessarily required. This 
hypothesis was common to Enlightenment authors who tried to explain in human terms the 
emergence of social norms and customs, interpersonal relations, language, and political 
institutions. It may initially be surprising to find believing Christians and Jews adhering to 
this view, for the naturalistic presupposition – human beings forging independently their 
mental and material culture – seems to run contrary to the biblical narrative. In Genesis, 
man is created by God and in his image; his faculties are intact or indeed perfect. Adam 
spoke a supposedly fully-fledged language while possessing substantial wisdom. 
Moreover, the most renowned ancient source for a wholly naturalistic account of cultural 
evolution was Lucretius’s De rerum natura. Despite some early modern attempts to 
rehabilitate or baptise Epicureanism, Epicurus and Lucretius were still widely considered 
as dangerously irreligious authors. Human beings, in their account, sprouted accidentally 
from the earth and forged their entire civilisation on their own. Gods did exist, albeit in 
                                                
2 On the differences between Mendelssohn and Maimon, see Freudenthal, No Religion without Idolatry: 
Mendelssohn’s Jewish Enlightenment (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), 65-76. For the 
suggested union of faiths: David Friedländer, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and Wilhelm Abraham Teller, A 
Debate on Jewish Emanicipation and Christian Theology in Old Berlin, ed. and trans. Richard Crouter and 
Julie Klassen (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004).  
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some liminal space between the worlds; they were largely indifferent to what the creatures 
of the earth did (or failed do) far below.3  
The mainstream Enlightenment genre of inquiries into the origin of language 
largely followed the example of the ancient Epicureans. However, divine providence and 
the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch could, for many an eighteenth-century author, be 
reconciled with the emergence of human language and civilisation in naturalistic terms. In 
Germany Johann David Michaelis, Moses Mendelssohn, and Johann Gottfried Herder 
joined a wide range of European authors, from Giambattista Vico and William Warburton 
to Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, who elaborated this naturalistic narrative of the evolution 
of language and society in works that would later be called conjectural histories of 
humanity.4 In order to ponder the countours and limits of Mendelssohn’s naturalism, it 
would be particularly useful to situate his views on Hebrew within the context of this 
volatile rapprochement between the Epicurean history of civilisation and religious belief. 
The young Mendelssohn’s first detailed discussion of the evolution of mind and 
language appeared in a commentary on his German translation of Rousseau’s Discourse on 
Inequality (1756).5 Mendelssohn was particularly troubled by Rousseau’s problematisation 
of the naturalistic emergence of language. Earlier authors such as Condillac and Warburton 
tended to project the emergence of human language over aeons of time, while assuming a 
very slow yet fairly smooth transition from the natural cries and gestures used by the first 
human beings to articulate, coventional language. The shift from natural to conventional 
signification was usually explained by recourse to human imagination, analogy, 
onomatopoeia, and metaphor in a gradual change of focus from present sensual objects to 
abstract entities in the past or the future. Rousseau, however, noted that this transition from 
natural signs to conventional words could not be logically explained, for it involved two 
incompatible categories. Projection over long dark ages did not solve this problem, 
according to Rousseau. Eventually, he claimed in the Discourse on Inequality, the 
                                                
3 On early modern Epicureanism, see Gianni Paganini und Edoardo Tortarolo (ed.), Der Garten und die 
Moderne. Epikureiche Moral und Politik vom Humanismus bis zur Aufklärung (Stuttgart: Frommann-
Holzboog, 2004); Catherine Wilson, Epicureanism at the Origins of Modernity (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008); Neven Leddy and Avi Lifschitz (ed.), Epicurus in the Enlightenment (Oxford: Voltaire 
Foundation, 2009). 
4 On the eighteenth-century background: Hans Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure: Essays on the Study of 
Language and Intellectual History (London: Athlone, 1982); Ulrich Ricken, Linguistics, Anthropology and 
Philosophy in the French Enlightenment, trans. Robert Norton (London: Routledge, 1994), and 
‘Mendelssohn und die Sprachtheorien der Aufklärung’ in Moses Mendelssohn im Spannungsfeld der 
Aufklärung, ed. Michael Albrecht and Eva J. Engel, (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2000), 
195-241; Avi Lifschitz, Language and Enlightenment: The Berlin Debates of the Eighteenth Century 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), chs. 1-2, and ‘Language’, in The Routledge Companion to 
Eighteenth Century Philosophy, ed. Aaron Garrett (London: Routledge, 2014), 663-83. 
5 Moses Mendelssohn, ‘Sendschreiben an den Herrn Magister Lessing in Leipzig’, in Gesammelte Schriften – 
Jubiläumsausgabe (Berlin/Stuttgart Bad-Cannstatt: Akademie Verlag/ Frommann-Holzboog, 1929- ), vol. 2, 
ed. Fritz Bamberger and Leo Strauss, 81-109 (henceforth referred to as JubA). This translation originated in 
the context of the early collaboration between Lessing and Mendelssohn; see Alexander Altmann, Moses 
Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), 36-50; Dominique Bourel, 
Moses Mendelssohn: la naissance du judaïsme moderne (Paris: Gallimard, 2004), 109-19. 
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naturalistic quest to explain the emergence of language in ‘purely human means’ was 
highly questionable.6  
 In reply, Mendelssohn resorted to Locke’s theory of the association of ideas: the 
identification of a sound or a sign with its natural referent (bleating with a sheep) might 
have accidentally shifted towards another object (the flowers in the meadow grazed by the 
sheep). The natural and free association of ideas, Mendelssohn suggested, could account 
for the gradual shift from natural to conventional signification. Yet while Mendelssohn 
maintained on the linguistic front a diachronic narrative of the evolution of abstract ideas 
and their signs, in the ethical realm he refused to acknowledge gradual evolution from 
bestial capacities to complete humanity. Human beings have always had the same bundle 
of basic capacities, and the state of nature was merely a particular instance where these 
capacities were dormant (in a similar manner to individual infancy). In Mendelssohn’s 
eyes, the qualities that made us human could not be discovered in a Rousseauvian thought 
experiment. Already in this early work we can identify the characteristic tension in 
Mendelssohn’s thought between, on the one hand, the wish to explain various phenomena 
in human terms as emerging over time, and on the other, a commitment to unchanging 
capacities or qualities that withstood the test of time and varied very little, if at all, from 
the creation of the universe to his own day.7 
 The other occasion for an elaborate discussion of human language and its evolution 
was the second part of Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem, or on Religious Power and Judaism 
(1783). Here we find a sophisticated explanation of the workings of both language and 
mind, testifying to Mendelssohn’s immersion in contemporary debates over the necessity 
of linguistic signs for a uniquely human self-orientation in the world. Human beings, 
Mendelssohn argued, could scarcely make sense of their perceptions without forming 
concepts for them, yet concepts could be fixed and preserved in the mind only by signs. 
Without such signs, the mind would not have been able to recall its perceptions at will. All 
languages naturally evolved when human beings focused their attention on a particular 
aspect of an object or a phenomenon, then attaching a name to it. As Mendelssohn 
admitted, by the early 1780s this had become a well-received theory, advocated by various 
authors from Condillac to Herder.  
 
Wise providence has placed within its [the soul’s] immediate reach a means 
which it can use at all times. It attaches, either by a natural or an arbitrary 
association of ideas, the abstracted characteristic to a perceptible sign which, 
as often as its impression is renewed, at once recalls and illuminates this 
characteristic, pure and unalloyed. In this manner, as is well known, 
originated the languages of men, which are composed of natural and arbitrary 
signs, and without which man would be but little distinguished from the 
                                                
6 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 144-49. 
7 On Mendelssohn’s commentary on Rousseau, see Ursula Goldenbaum’s introduction to her edition of 
Rousseau, Abhandlung von dem Ursprung der Ungleichheit unter den Menschen, trans. Moses Mendelssohn 
(Weimar: Böhlau, 2000); Lifschitz, ‘Language as a Means and an Obstacle to Freedom: The Case of Moses 
Mendelssohn’, in Freedom and the Construction of Europe, ed. Quentin Skinner and Martin van Gelderen 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), vol. 2, 84-102.  
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irrational animals; for without the aid of signs, man can scarcely remove 
himself one step from the sensual.8  
 
In another potential attempt to respond to Rousseau’s challenge, Mendelssohn linked here 
the naturalistic scenario of the evolution of language (thanks to human imagination, 
creativity, needs or passion) to divine providence. Like Herder’s prize essay on the origin 
of language (1771), this was not a narrative where God actively intervened: man was 
created in such a way as to enable him to invent and develop language naturally, on his 
own. Herder had argued in 1771 that the divine origin of language was ‘entirely 
irreligious’ in that it required God to assist his creation constantly. It was much worthier of 
God, Herder thought, to let his creation (the human mind) develop language on its own: 
‘the origin of language hence only becomes divine in a worthy manner insofar as it is 
human’.9  
While Herder portrayed language and the attentive power of the mind 
(Besonnenheit) as eternal markers of human beings as such, with no point of departure, 
Mendelssohn’s account in Jerusalem did include a developmental narrative. This narrative 
helped him to distinguish between the initially beneficial qualities of spoken language and 
the lamentable results of the invention of written script. Yet the maintenanace of a 
diachronic perspective on language in Jerusalem was attenuated by Mendelssohn’s 
emphasis on a latent capacity for reason and arbitrary signification, provided by divine 
providence and awaiting human activation. The tendency to depict human beings, at least 
on the ethical front, as possessing timeless qualities was manifest already in the 1756 
commentary on Rousseau, yet both there and in the much later Jerusalem, Mendelssohn 
felt the need to reconcile divine providence with a naturalistic history of human 
civilisation. In 1756 he did not yet refer to a providentally implanted capacity for language, 
and even in the passage cited above from Jerusalem the heuristic function of providence 
may be questioned. In order to better understand how Mendelssohn grappled with the 
possibility of a purely naturalistic explanantion of language and civilisation, one has to turn 
to his unpublished notes about language (first edited by Eva Engel in 1981).10 
In what was possibly a draft submission to the 1771 Berlin contest on the origin of 
language, Mendelssohn tackled directly one of the basic assumptions of the naturalistic 
theory. If, from Epicurus onwards, naturalistic authors supposed that human beings 
invented their language and evolved the accompanying mental capacities, it followed that 
initially they had been speechless. In 1766 Johan Peter Süßmilch published a treatise 
where, taking up some of Rousseau’s arguments while adding his own, he questioned 
precisely this naturalistic premise. Human beings without language would have forever 
remained limited animals; indeed, they could not be properly referred to as human beings 
                                                
8 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, or on Religious Power and Judaism, trans. Allan Arkush, ed. Alexander Altmann 
(Hanover: University Press of New England, 1983), 105; JubA 8, 171-72. 
9 Johann Gottfried Herder, Philosophical Writings, ed. Michael N. Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 163-64; ‘Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache’, in Frühe Schriften 1764-
1772, ed. Ulrich Gaier (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1985), 809-10. 
10 Mendelssohn, ‘Über die Sprache’, in JubA 6.2, ed. Eva J. Engel and Alexander Altmann, 3-23. 
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at all.11 Süßmilch’s treatise, sharply and memorably (if inaccurately) criticised by Herder 
in his prize essay, prompted a reassessement of the very premises of the naturalistic 
scenario. In his notes on the origin of language, Mendelssohn made it clear that a divine 
endowment of language should be assumed only if the total impossibility of its natural 
emergence could be proven, or if a longer time would have been required for the 
development of language than that available to the first human beings.  
For Mendelssohn, the difficulty in assuming a shift from speechlessness to the use 
of language, or from natural signs to arbitrary ones, would be unsolvable if one claimed – 
like Rousseau and others – that most of the features distinguishing man from beast were 
acquired over time (‘artificial’ or ‘adventitious’, in eighteenth-century terminology). 
Mendelssohn took here seriously the challenge mounted by Rousseau and Süßmilch. If 
natural signs and arbitrary words were two different conceptual categories – and if the 
capacities, drives, and inclinations of the first humans were not too different from those of 
animals – the naturalistic history of language was indeed a philosophical puzzle. There 
must have therefore been a cognitive divergence between man and beast from the outset, 
especially in regard to human intentionality. As Mendelssohn argued, to be reminded of 
something by a natural sign required very rudimentary powers of attention and 
imagination, on the animalistic level; but to represent the same thing actively through 
arbitrary signs amounted to genuine wisdom. For Mendelssohn, it was the intention to 
convey a certain message by attaching conventional signs to particular aspects of objects 
that made human language categorically different from bestial conmmunication.  
 
The miracle-making almighty himself cannot endow man with language, if he 
does not provide him earlier with the capacity to have resolve for it – that is, to 
wish to denote things by arbitrary signs. [...] But if the almighty himself must 
equip us with this platform for reason [Vernunftanlage] before he endows us 
with language, it is much more adequate to consider this platform for reason as 
innately given [anerschaffen] and not just to equate its condition in the state of 
nature with that of animals. What the almighty can give miraculously to 
created man, he might as well have designed man to do upon his creation.12  
 
Mendelssohn argued in these notes along similar lines to Herder’s prize essay. With all due 
respect to benevolent providence, it would be unncecessarily bold to explain a 
phenomenon  by reference to miraculous divine intervention and without recourse to 
natural causes. Human beings once used to explain all natural phenomena by reference to 
divinely mysterious causes, Mendelssohn noted, but eighteenth-century European culture 
had emerged from this childish relationship with external reality. It was much more 
respectable for God to act through ‘wise means’ than through immediate intervention.13 
                                                
11 Johann Peter Süßmilch, Versuch eines Beweises, daß die erste Sprache ihren Ursprung nicht vom 
Menschen, sondern allein vom Schöpfer erhalten habe (Berlin: Buchladen der Realschule, 1766), 31-2; 88-
90. 
 
12 JubA 6.2, 7. Original emphases; English translations here and henceforth are mine unless otherwise stated. 
13 Ibid., 6. 
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Concerning the origin of language, these means could be innate platforms for human 
reason, intentionality, and arbitrary signification. Such platforms were embedded within 
the human being by divine providence; they might or might not be activated at a certain 
point in history, but their realisation was in any case a matter of natural human trial, error, 
discovery, and self-perfection. 
 In Jerusalem, Mendelssohn distinguished between eternal truths, which are 
accessible to all human beings in all times and places either via reason or through the 
senses, and historical truths that occurred only once. In the case of such truths, we must 
rely on the credibility and authority of testimonies.14 It is the first kind of truths – eternal, 
natural, and universally accessible – which concern Mendelssohn’s reflections on the 
general origin of language, for here he was interested in the cognitive equipment allowing 
human beings everywhere to perceive external reality. His unpublished discussion of the 
providential design of a human platform for reason and language may, however, link his 
ideas of human language in general with his views on the historical truths of revelation, 
given to a particular people at a certain time and in a specific language.15 
 
 
Hebrew: an affective, providential idiom 
 
While Mendelssohn was reflecting and working on Jerusalem, in 1782-83, he also wrote 
the introduction to one of the most ambitious projects of the Berlin Haskalah: a translation 
of the Pentateuch into German (in Hebrew letters) on which he collaborated with his 
children’s tutor, Solomon ben Joel Dubno (1738-1813), and others. The project was called 
‘Sefer Netivot ha-Shalom’ (The Book of the Paths of Peace), and its introduction was titled 
‘Or la-Netivah’ (Light for the Path). Turning to Mendelssohn’s Hebrew introduction to this 
German translation of the Pentateuch, one may be struck by the different perspective on 
language and its evolution so manifest in this text. After a summary of Mendelssohn’s 
account of Hebrew and the transmission of the Torah, I shall discuss the seeming 
differences between his views on the history of Hebrew and his naturalistic theory of 
language, suggesting that these varying perspectives were perhaps not as distant from one 
another as they might initially seem. 
According to Mendelssohn’s introduction to this translation, the language in which 
the Torah was written was the same one in which God spoke to Adam, Cain, Noah, Moses, 
and the prophets, as well as the idiom in which God endowed the Israelites with the 
decalogue at Sinai. By definition it had to be a superior language to all others - hence it 
came to be known as ‘the holy tongue’. Yet its peculiar qualities were not at all 
miraculous; they could simply be traced back to the providential maintenance of the 
natural characteristics of the original human means of communication. Hebrew was, in 
Mendelssohn’s eyes, closer to the symbolic and musical language of action, the first idiom 
of mankind which penetrated immediately into the heart. Unlike the conventional or 
arbitrary signification of words in modern languages, in the language of action – and in its 
                                                
14 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem, 90-93; JubA 8, 157-60. 
15 Cf. Grit Schorch, Moses Mendelssohns Sprachpolitik (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 93-95.  
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relics still preserved in Hebrew – names reflected to some extent the essence of the things 
they denoted (e. g. the link between Adam, ‘man’ and Adamah, ‘earth’, or that between 
Chavah (Eve) and Chayim, ‘life’).16 Mendelssohn noted that until the confusion of 
langauges at Babel there was only a single language on earth, which later multiplied into 
seventy idioms. Some were closer to the original tongue, some farther removed from it. 
The holy language remained in its purity only with Ever, father of Peleg and his progeny. 
From this line it reached Abraham and his family, eventually surviving the Egyptian exile 
to be spoken by the Israelites in Sinai. According to Mendelssohn, over the course of this 
long history Hebrew did not change at all, as attested by proper names and place names in 
different books of the Torah.17 
 This was not necessarily a dogmatic defence of the immutablity of Hebrew as 
opposed to all other natural languages, for Mendelssohn combined it with a remarkable 
awareness of the pragmatic aspects of language use (paralleling his discussion of language 
in Jerusalem). The main idea was that the original inventors or speakers of human 
language (in Jerusalem) or the ancient and modern users of Hebrew (in Or la-Netivah) 
shared a dynamism that was reminiscent of the vivid origin of language. In order for 
language to mirror thought in the best manner and for a speaker’s words to penetrate the 
heart of the listener rather than pass her by, language had to be accentuated. The raising 
and lowering of the voice, the melodious incantation of some phrases, and the pauses and 
breaks in speech were all meant to leave an indelible impression.18 Mendelssohn argued 
that without such means, the ancient phrases would have resembled dry bones lacking any 
living spirit. Only through musical accentuation could one strikingly express anger and 
love, willingness and revenge, joy and sadness.19 For Mendelssohn, it was on this non-
semantic level, on the terrain of effecting pragmatic and emotional responses, that Hebrew 
excelled all other tongues. Its vowel points, accents, and cantillation marks (Ta’amei ha-
Mikra) preserved the primordial mode of speech that had all but disappeared in other 
natural languages. This is the reason, Mendelssohn argued, that the preferred mode of 
instruction in Judaism was face-to-face teaching or reading aloud. In Jersualem he 
criticised the distant learning enabled by print culture, comparing it unfavourably to earlier 
                                                
16 Cf. Arnold Eisen, ‘Divine Legislation as ‘Ceremonial Script’: Mendelssohn on the Commandments’, 
Association for Jewish Studies Review 15 (1990), 239-67; Daniel Krochmalnik, ‘Das Zeremoniell als 
Zeichensprache. Moses Mendelssohns Apologie des Judentums im Rahmen der aufklärerischen Semiotik’, in 
Fremde Vernunft, ed. Josef Simon and Werner Stegmaier (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998), 238-85; Carola 
Hilfrich, Lebendige Schrift. Repräsentation und Idolatrie in Moses Mendelssohns Philosophie und Exegese 
des Judentums, (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 2000), 105-35; Andrea Schatz, Sprache in der Zerstreuung. Die 
Säkularisierung des Hebräischen im 18. Jahrhundert (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 249-54. 
17 Mendelssohn, ‘Or la-Netivah’ in JubA 14, ed. Haim Borodianski (Bar-Dayan), 213-17; JubA 9.1 (ed. 
Werner Weinberg), 8-11. 
18 Mendelssohn’s ideas on Hebrew resemble the medieval theory of Judah Halevi, though their application is 
not similar. See Halevi, The Kuzari (part I, §49-56; part II, §67-81), trans. Hartwig Hirschfeld, ed. Henry 
Slonimsky (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), 50-51 and 124-34; Raphael Jospe, ‘The Superiority of Oral 
over Written Communication: Judah Ha-Levi’s Kuzari and Modern Jewish Thought’, in From Ancient Israel 
to Modern Judaism: Essays in Honor of Marvin Fox, ed. Jacob Neusner, Ernest S. Frerichs and Nahum M. 
Sarna (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), vol. 3, 127-56; David Sorkin, Moses Mendelssohn and the Religious 
Enlightenment (London: Peter Halban, 1996), 66-67; Adam Shear, The Kuzari and the Shaping of Jewish 
Identity, 1167-1900 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 230-35. 
19 For Rousseau’s similar ideas, see Lifschitz, ‘How to Do Things with Signs: Rousseau’s Ancient 
Performative Idiom’, in History of Political Thought, forthcoming.  
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modes of personal instruction; in Or la-Netivah we find a very similar account of the 
merits of the ancient means of education. Yet here these advantages are more specifically 
attributed to Hebrew alone and linked to the transmission of the Torah.  
 
The son learning from the mouth of his father, or the pupil hearing from the 
teacher’s mouth, listened to the words with all the appropriate order of 
pronunciation, which the father and the teacher too had heard from their 
fathers or teachers, for the commandment is to recite the Torah to your son 
diligently so that the words be sharpened in his mouth. They did not give the 
holy Scripture to their sons or pupils and left them alone to read it from the 
written script, for in this way [the Torah] would have become a sealed book. 
They [fathers and teachers] read it out in front of them [children and pupils], 
and repeated it aloud with them in melody and singing, thereby transmitting 
the accents of the Torah, and sweetening the honey of its words, until these 
words penetrated their heart and remained there as implanted nails and 
spurs.20 
 
Beyond Mendelssohn’s initial point concerning the semantic advantages of Hebrew – 
which, he admitted, were not equally present in all its registers – the heaviest emphasis in 
Or la-Netivah was placed on the reliable and continuous transmission of the original and 
lively characteristics of the holy tongue. Without an authentic chain of transmission of its 
vowel points and cantillation marks, Hebrew might have been subject to the vicissitudes 
inherent in the history of any other language and accompanying the transmission of all 
historical documents.  
Mendelssohn opted here for a very strong version of the antiquity of the Hebrew 
vowel points (Nikud) and accentuation marks. He did so deliberately, while briefly 
referring to the long controversy over the origin of the vowel points – a serious bone of 
contention in Jewish, Protestant, and Catholic scholarship over the preceding two 
centuries. The initial absence of signs signifying the vowels in the Hebrew script 
confronted Protestant theologians with an acute problem. Luther’s emphasis on the direct 
impact of the biblical text upon individual readers required a stable and reliable version of 
the Bible. In the case of the Old Testament, most Lutherans initially accepted as immutable 
and divinely inspired the sixteenth-century Venetian edition of the Pentateuch (1525), 
vowel-pointed according to the established Jewish convention, the Masorah.21 Catholic 
scholars, on the other hand, tended to reassert the necessity of the Church as an 
institutional interpreter of Scripture by undermining the authority of the biblical Hebrew 
                                                
20 JubA 14, 218; JubA 9.1, 16-17. The allusion is to Deuteronomy 6:7: ‘And thou shalt teach them diligently 
unto thy children, and shalt talk of them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, 
and when thou liest down, and when thou risest up.’ (King James Version) 
21 The vowel points were probably introduced in the last centuries of the first millennium and generally 
accepted by Jewish communities by the tenth century CE. See Richard A. Muller, ‘The Debate over the 
Vowel Points and the Crisis in Orthodox Hermenutics’, Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 10 
(1980), 53-72; Maurice Olender, The Languages of Paradise, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA, 
1992), 23-28; Noel Malcolm, ‘Hobbes, Ezra and the Bible: The History of a Subversive Idea’, in Aspects of 
Hobbes (Oxford, 2002), 383-431. 
  
10 
 
text. One of the Catholic strategies was to argue that the vowel points were added to the 
Hebrew consonantal script at a late stage and not fixed by Ezra the Scribe and his Great 
Synagogue in the fifth century BCE, as accepted by the Jewish tradition. Catholic scholars 
argued, therefore, for the primacy of the Vulgate Latin translation over the Hebrew original 
by maintaining that errors had occurred in the process of vocalisation - the relatively late 
addition of vowel points to the Old Testament. 
From the late seventeenth century onwards, with the discovery of variations in 
ancient biblical manuscripts, Protestant authors realised that their position was no longer 
tenable and began to to revise it. This revisionist trend in Protestant scholarship could be 
witnessed in the career of one of the foremost orientalists and biblical scholars of the 
eighteenth century, Johann David Michaelis, with whom Mendelssohn maintained a long 
correspondence. In his doctoral dissertation at Halle (1739) and his first book, Anfangs-
Gründe der hebräischen Accentuation (Basics of Hebrew Accentuation, 1741), Michaelis 
adhered to the traditional Protestant view that the Hebrew vowel points were extremely 
ancient. Similarly to Mendelssohn’s view forty years later, Michaelis argued that the vowel 
points had already been in use by the time of Moses and have since undergone remarkably 
little change. By the late 1750s, however, Michaelis had changed his mind and regarded all 
languages, Hebrew included, as evolving regularly along the lines of the naturalistic thesis. 
The vowel points, Michaelis admitted, were introduced at a late stage, probably in the early 
Middle Ages. The occasion for Michaelis’s confession concerning his change of mind was 
the publication of the first instalments of his own translation of the Old Testament into 
German (1769-1770).22  
 Michaelis’s transformation in the 1750s suggests that Mendelssohn opted in the 
1780s for an outmoded and conservative stance on the authenticity, antiquity, and 
reliability of the vowel points in the Masoretic Hebrew Bible. In Or la-Netivah he insisted, 
as we have seen, on an unbroken change of melodious face-to-face transmission of the 
accents, vowels, and cantillation marks of the Torah. Mendelssohn conceded that some 
specific diacritical marks were introduced only after the Babylonian exile, when Hebrew 
was gradually replaced by other languages for profane purposes. Yet the signs introduced 
by Ezra the Scribe and later by the medieval Masoretes of Tiberias were a genuine 
representation of the sung, acted, and recited ways in which the correct pronunciation had 
been handed down from Moses. In this context Mendelssohn attacked Elias Levita 
(Eliyahu Bachur), a Jewish Renaissance scholar who suggested that the vowel points did 
not exist at the time of the Talmud and that they were introduced by the Tiberian 
Masoretes in the early Middle Ages.23 This critique is telling, for Mendelssohn could have 
otherwise aligned himself with Levita or other modern Jewish and Protestant scholars, all 
orthodox believers, who argued for the late introduction of the vowel points and the 
biblical accents. In a sense, Mendelssohn’s conservative attitude on this front distanced 
him from Protestant thinkers of the German Enlightenment (Aufklärung) with whom he 
                                                
22 Lifschitz, Language and Enlightenment, 96-117; ‘An Epicurean democracy in language: the volte face in 
Johann David Michaelis’s early career’, in Life forms in the thinking of the long eighteenth century, ed. Keith 
Michael Baker and Jenna M. Gibbs (Toronto: Toronto University Press, forthcoming). 
23 JubA 14, 224-28; JubA 9.1, 27-32. 
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was associated in other domains, rendering him much closer to traditionally minded and at 
times anti-Jewish theologians who were usually the enemies of the Aufklärer.24  
The reason for Mendelssohn’s adoption of this rather peculiar stance seems to 
inhere in the raison d’être of his entire project for a new translation of the Pentateuch into 
German. Around 1780 there was no lack of recent German versions, philologically sound 
and scholarly attuned to changing notions of of poetry, revelation, and legislation 
(including Michaelis’s highly regarded enterprise). These Bibles were usually translated by 
scholars who applied the latest methods of critical inquiry to the text. On the basis of 
comparison with other Semitic languages and the collation of all available manuscripts, 
they suggested ammendments and improvements to the text by translating some Hebrew 
terms according to related ancient semantic fields – often departing from the rabbinic 
interpretations of the same words. Mendelssohn, however, could not pursue the same route. 
He translated the Pentateuch yet again into German, in Hebrew letters, in order to protect 
acculturated and acculturating Jews precisely from these scholarly trends. In his eyes, 
Christian biblical scholars did not approach the Pentatuech in the same way that he (or the 
members of any Jewish community) did. For a contemporary Aufklärer such as Michaelis, 
the Old Testament was mostly an account of ancient legislation, social customs, and 
natural history – not a valid set of instructions to preserve and fulfil at present.25  
Much more was at stake for the Jews, as the rituals and practical laws revealed to 
Moses formed the very basis of their faith. After all, Mendelssohn argued in Jerusalem that 
Judaism knew no revealed theology in the sense of a Christian catechism or the Nicean 
creed. Theologically, Judaism was simply a natural religion par excellence. Its tenets – the 
existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and providential rewards and punishmets – 
could, like any essential truth, be universally adduced by any human being from the very 
nature of things. What made Judaism unique, the content of the Sinaitic revelation, was the 
ceremonial law. In order to preserve and re-enact these ceremonies and rituals, one had to 
be certain that one’s actions corresponded to those revealed at Sinai; any minute 
modification might change the meaning of these revealed historical truths. Mendelssohn 
could not see here eye to eye here with Christian authors who were otherwise his partners 
in the Enlightenment venture. For most of them, regarding a certain biblical term as the 
result of corrupt copying (and suggesting a substitute) was a matter of pure scholarship. 
For Mendelssohn and other Maskilim, it was a hubristic presumption. It amounted to 
changing God’s word – opaque as this word was, and even if it required oblique rabbinic 
interpretations.  
In the absence of scholarly consensus on a canonic or authentic version, 
Mendelssohn viewed contemporary biblical criticism as ruled by arbitrariness and 
                                                
24 For example, Olaf Gerhard Tychsen who attacked in the 1770s the methods of contemporary biblical 
scholarship; Mendelssohn commended some of his views on Hebrew. See Edward Breuer, The Limits of 
Enlightenment: Jews, Germans, and the Eighteenth-Century Study of Scripture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Center for Jewish Studies, 1996), chs. 5-6. 
25 See Michaelis’s distinction between the purposes of his own work on Moasic legislation (Mosaisches 
Recht, 1770-75) and Mendelssohn’s overview of contemporary Jewish law (Ritualgesetze der Juden, 1778) 
in Orientalische und Exegetische Bibliothek 13 (Frankfurt am Mayn: Johann Gottlieb Garbe, 1778), 72-77; 
Lifschitz, Language and Enlightenment, 109-13. More generally on Michaelis’s exegesis, see Michael 
Legaspi, The Death of Scripture and the Rise of Biblical Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
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scholarly impertinence. Indeed, he had already experienced at first hand the impact of the 
Neologist school of criticism. In 1772 Johann Salomo Semler, professor of theology at the 
University of Halle, dedicated to Mendelssohn a translation of Elias Levita’s treatise on the 
late introduction of the vowel points into the Hebrew Bible. Semler, who elsewhere 
suggested that concentrated extracts of the Old Testament would suffice to convey its main 
message, regarded the ethical precepts of the Bible as its most significant core. Since 
Christianity was, for him, a religion unfolding in changing historical configurations, he 
distinguished between its external historical forms (among them particular books and 
articles of faith) and the self-perfection of the ‘inner man’.26 Therefore, Semler praised 
Levita for what he saw as a radical departure from the traditional Jewish attitude towards 
the divinely guaranteed transmission of the biblical text. In a gesture of self-congratulation, 
Semler compared Levita’s stance to that of modern Protestant scholars who managed to 
overcome the ‘prejudices’ of their predecessors concerning the antiquity and authenticity 
of the vowel points. His dedication of this work to Mendelssohn – in the hope that ‘more 
serious schoalrs in the two parties would decide to enlighten their contemporaries’ – was a 
cunning attempt to prompt the Jewish philosopher to take a public stance on this issue.27 
Mendelssohn, however, opted for silence. He probably did not wish to publicly criticise 
progressive Protestant theologians, some of whom supported his pleas for Jewish 
emancipation, while as a member of a Jewish community he could not disavow the 
providentially maintained chain of transmission.  
Leaving Semler’s public appeal unanswered, in private letters Mendelssohn 
explicitly hurled the charge of arbitrariness at comtemporary biblical scholars.28 Once one 
strayed away from the canonised Masoretic text, one could come up with any sort of 
interpretation on the basis of allegedly sound scholarship; yet who would act as a final 
arbiter and define conclusively the proper meaning of a supposedly corrupt term? 
Mendelssohn required scholarly modesty and intellectual humility in this respect. As he 
solemnly stated at the outset of the introduction to his translation of the Pentateuch, ‘we, 
the whole community of Israel, believe that exactly as our teacher Moses wrote it, so we 
now have his Torah. Nothing has changed in it ever since, and it was not subject to what 
profane books undergo’.29 A similar conviction was voiced by Isaac Euchel, a Königsberg-
based Maskil who edited the contemporary Hebrew perdiodical Hame’asef. In a 1784 
                                                
26 For Michaelis’s own critique of Semler’s tendency to downplay the historical and other non-ethical aspects 
of the Bible see Lifschitz, Language and Enlightenment, 112-13. On Semler’s theological philosophy of 
history, see Peter H. Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1975) 169-72; Gottfried Hornig, Johann Salomo Semler: Studien zu Leben und Werk des 
Hallenser Aufklärungstheologe (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1996), esp. 160-209. 
27 Uebersetzung des Buchs Massoreth Hammassoreth, unter Aufsicht und mit Anmerkungen D. Joh. Salomo 
Semlers (Halle: Carl Hermann Hemmerde, 1772), dedication (unpaginated). See also Semler’s private letter 
to Mendelssohn (JubA 12.2, ed. Alexander Altmann, 14-18), where he hopes for greater Jewish 
understanding of the moral perfection embedded in genuine Christianity and its messiah. Mendelssohn 
thought Semler exhibited ‘an enthusiasm for the truth together with a lack of acquaintance with the world and 
human beings, a spirit of inquiry without philosophy, and critical erudition without knowledge of the 
beautiful’. (Mendelssohn to Michaelis, 25 June 1772, ibid., 29-30.) 
28 JubA 12.2, 33-4; 41-3; see also Avigdor Levi’s Hebrew edition and annotation of the letters Mendelssohn 
sent him: Igrot meha-Hacham […] Moshe Dessau (Vienna: Anton Schmid, 1794), third comment on the 
third letter (7).  
29 JubA 14, 213; JubA 9.1, 8. 
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exchange with a local university professor about the interpretation of a particular biblical 
passage, Euchel made it clear that practicing Jews did not have the same range of 
interpretative options available to their Christian peers, ‘for we have pledged allegiance to 
the flag of the Masoretes’. Learned Jews, immersed equally in traditional rabbinic 
literature and modern biblical criticism, felt alienated and surprised by ‘how men take the 
liberty to regard the text as corrupt and hence choose ways of reading after their liking’.30  
Euchel’s public accusation and Mendelssohn’s private complaint both refer to 
randomness as the major characteristic of modern biblical criticism. They tried to 
demonstrate that Jews were well aware of the long debates over the authenticity of the 
Masoretic Hebrew Bible (concerning manuscript variants, the antiquity of the vowel 
points, comparisons with Samaritan versions, etc.). Yet while the Jews had to abide by the 
text of the Masoretes, their stance did not involve the renunciation of reason or critical 
thought. In Mendelssohn’s published work it is clear that beyond the essential, universal 
truths of natural religion – which could and should be accessible to any rational being – the 
uniqueness of Judaism as an independent faith was rooted in the revealed ceremonial law. 
Revelation, however, afforded and admitted no logical proof. Like any historical event, it 
had to be taken on trust by those who did not witness it and thus had access only to 
historical testimonies.31 When Jews committed themselves to the faith of their forefathers, 
they could not pick and choose the ceremonies to be performed, the versions of the Bible 
to be trusted, or the interpretative strategies to be employed.32 This firm view was also 
expressed in Mendelssohn’s attitude towards the entire edifice of rabbinic literature. While 
Christian scholars regarded its sometimes far-fetched and non-contextual interpretations as 
irrelevant to the understanding of the original biblical text, Mendelssohn tried to vindicate 
the worth of derash (complex interpretation) in parallel to the more straightforward and 
philological peshat explanation.33 In this respect he went so far as to criticise medieval 
Jewish scholars who, insisting on rational peshat interpretations, condemned Talmudic 
commentaries on parts of the Old Testament.34 Mendelssohn’s self-identification with the 
golden age of Andalusian Judaism had its limits when it came to the disavowal of rabbinic 
interpretations that had been integrated into the historically transmitted Jewish tradition. 
 
 
Against arbitrariness: reconciling nature and providence 
 
The lack of a consensually agreed point of reference triggered, according to Mendelssohn 
and Euchel, scholarly arbitrariness, confusion, and anarchy. This point also reflected 
Mendelssohn’s view of modern languages. Language, especially in the later stages of its 
evolution, lost the suppleness and directness of the original idiom of action which reached 
so immediately the heart of listeners. For Mendelssohn, the gradual transition from natural 
                                                
30 Euchel in Erste Zugabe zu der hebräischen Monatsschrift dem Sammler (ףסאמה), hrsg. von einer 
Gesellschaft hebräischer Litteraturfreunde zu Königsberg (January 1784), 12, 11.  
31 Cf. Freudenthal, No Religion, 80-86. 
32 Jerusalem, 133-34; JubA 8, 198-99. 
33 See particularly Mendelssohn’s introduction to his commentary on Ecclesiastes (1768-70): JubA 14, 148-
60. 
34 Breuer, Limits of Enlightenment, 218-19. 
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signs via metaphor and analogy to purely conventional words enabled great scientific 
endevours while at the same time jettisoning the liveliness and unequivocality of the 
language of action (and risking descent into idolatry).35 The arbitrariness of modern 
conventional signs, which lacked any necessary link to the nature of what they stood for, 
was mirrored by the arbitrariness of biblical scholarship. In both domains there was no 
guarantee of an authentic connection between sign and signified. Just as the essence of a 
tree was not necessarily better conveyed by the German word ‘Baum’ than by the French 
‘arbre’, no one could vouchsafe the degree to which a certain scholarly interpretation (or 
another) elucidated the original meaning of a biblical term. A similar point was made in the 
1760s by Thomas Abbt, Mendelssohn’s friend and collaborator in the Berlin 
Enlightenment circles. Reviewing recent conjectural histories of humanity (especially 
Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequality), Abbt emphasised the lack of methodological criteria 
that could prioritise specific accounts of human nature and origins. Since the biblical 
account did not preclude pertinent conjectures, Abbt regarded Genesis as a consensual 
vantage point which might spare his peers their constant disputes over distant origins.36  
In eighteenth-century terminology, at the opposite end to arbitrariness usually stood 
nature. Phenomena evolving naturally and organically, usually within the context of a 
human community, were contrasted with those subject to chance or to the whim of a single 
scholar.37 The belief in a long chain of authentic oral transmission of the Torah provided 
Mendelssohn with a solution to the related problems of modern linguistic arbitrariness and 
scholarly presumption among biblical critics. According to Mendelssohn, the tenets of 
Judaism had been handed down through lively face-to-face exchange, not via rote learning 
of scripted instructions. The ceremonial law was a ‘living script, stirring heart and mind’ to 
be observed and imitated by its students, a set of meaningful actions which were the 
occasion for further reflection and edification.38 In Jerusalem Mendelssohn outlined the 
detrimental effects of written or printed characters on religious belief and human culture. 
The general descent into modern linguistic arbitrariness was countered for him by ‘living 
script’, the Jewish ceremonial law preserving some vital qualities of the original language 
of action. Images and hieroglyphs prompted idolatry and superstition, while alphabetical 
script was too arbitrary and abstract (in a similar manner to Christian creeds and 
catechisms). Actions, by contrast, were ephemeral, so that there was no risk of their 
misinterpretation for idolatrous purposes; they also encouraged social interaction and 
mutual imitation. The principles of Judaism were therefore linked to everyday activities 
and rituals, each having its value in prompting further reflection.  
                                                
35 Jerusalem 107-11; JubA 8, 173-77. On the links between written characters and false worship in 
Mendelssohn’s thought, see Freudenthal’s detailed discussion in No Religion, 105-59. 
36 Thomas Abbt, Fragment der aeltesten Begebenheiten des menschlichen Geschlechts, ed. Johann Peter 
Miller (Halle: Johann Justinus Gebauer, 1767), 36-48; Lifschitz, ‘Genesis for Historians: Thomas Abbt on 
Biblical and Conjectural Accounts of Human Nature’, History of European Ideas, forthcoming. 
37 Cordula Neis, ‘Arbitrarität’, in Gerda Haßler and Cordula Neis, Lexikon sprachtheoretischer Grundbegriffe 
des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009), vol. 1, 206-19; Lifschitz, ‘The Arbitrariness of the 
Linguistic Sign: Variations on an Enlightenment Theme’, Journal of the History of Ideas 73.4 (2012), 537-
57.  
38 Jerusalem, 102; JubA 8, 169. 
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 Joining the contemporary critique of the notion of an arbitrary invention of 
language, Mendelssohn – like Leibniz, Michaelis, Condillac, and Turgot – emphasised the 
historical and natural evolution of language by a community of speakers as a bulwark 
against human chance and randomness.39 For these authors, nothing emerging from natural 
causes and historical change within human society could be completely arbitrary, since the 
range of contingent events was limited by their physical and social contexts. Individuals 
could try to invent new words or modify accepted meanings, but they could not wilfully 
change the general sense of terms and actions. Such modifications could only be 
sanctioned slowly and gradually by the community as a whole. 
This critique of arbitrariness applied to all ancient and modern languages. Yet 
Mendelssohn’s accompanying notion of the authentic transmission of Hebrew and the 
Torah also left sufficient theoretical space for his espousal of indirect providence operating 
via the conscious action of human beings rather than through miracles and immediate 
divine intervention. Oral instruction and ‘living script’ were employed by him to counter 
the views that the Hebrew vowel points were a late invention and that some loci in the 
Hebrew Bible were subject to textual corruption. In this way, the seemingly supernatural 
aspects of spoken Hebrew could be naturalised by constant and lively human conversation 
across the ages. Their written forms were, to some extent, superfluous aids; the sages 
would have gone on chanting and accentuating the living script of the Torah even without 
recourse to written or printed signs. This is what made both the Jewish ceremonial law and 
its rabbinic commentary indispendable for Mendelssohn.  
Heinrich Heine, wrongly assuming that Mendelssohn rejected rabbinic literature, 
could not understand how this allegedly radical reformer still adhered to the Mosaic 
ceremonial law. He ended up speculating that for Mendelssohn the ceremonial law 
functioned as a defence of deism, which was ‘his most inner faith’.40 I would beg to differ: 
Mendelssohn did not overthrow the post-exilic Jewish tradition precisely because it 
provided the missing links between the present day and a ceremonial law preserving the 
relics of the language of action. Every single link in this chain of transmission offered an 
insight into a primordial relationship between word and thing that was both natural and 
providentially guaranteed.  
 
 
                                                
39 Lifschitz, ‘The Arbitrariness of the Linguistic Sign’, 545-54. 
40 Heine, History of Religion and Philosophy, 70-71; Heines Werke, vol. 5, 85-86. 
